Personal
Gods, Deism, & the Limits of Skepticism
By Massimo Pigliucci
"The most common of
all follies is to believe passionately in the palpably not true. It is the
chief occupation of mankind."
--H.L. Menken
The relationship between
science and religion (S&R), and even the one between skepticism and
religion, is warming up. At least, that is the feeling one gets from a cursory
look at recent happenings, from the publication of books and articles in
popular magazines about science "finding" God, to the frantic
activities of the Templeton Foundation "for the furthering of
religion." Two scientists--Paul Davies, and most recently Freeman
Dyson--received the one-million dollar Templeton Prize for "progress in
religion," the single largest cash prize in history. S&R is not just
warm, it's hot!
Thus, the time is ripe for
a skeptical analysis of the subject, which, to me, seems muddled by two basic
sources of confusion: 1) we need to separate logical/philosophical arguments
from those that are either pragmatic or concern freedom of speech; 2) we have
to acknowledge that possible positions on the S&R question are many more
than usually considered, and that a thorough understanding of the whole gamut
is necessary in order to make some sort of progress. This article presents an
analysis of both these sources of confusion and presents an attempt at a
classification scheme of the available positions. Since there is no such thing
as truly objective reporting,1 I will advocate my own
position as well.
What the Discussion is
and is Not About
Lest I be accused once
again of being a "rabid atheist"2 let me make my position clear: I am
an atheist in the sense of someone who does not think there is any good reason
to believe in a supernatural entity that created and somehow supervises the
universe. I do not know that such an entity is non existent, but until
extraordinary evidence is provided to substantiate such an extraordinary claim,
I relegate God to the same realm as Santa Claus.
Rabid I am not, if by that
one means an attitude of unreasonable adherence to a doctrine more accepted
than carefully considered. My interest in religion comes out of a personal
journey about finding out how things really are; since I am an educator who
believes that helping people think critically will result in a better society,
I also must defend against other people's attempt to curtail my
freedom of thought and speech.
Let us briefly examine the
three components of the science and religion debate and attempt to separate
them as clearly as possible.
1. The relationship between
science and religion is a legitimate area of philosophical inquiry which must
be informed by both religion (theology) and science.
2. S&R discussions,
especially in the
3. Discussing S&R has
repercussions on the cherished value of freedom of speech for scientists,
skeptics, and religionists.
Point 1 is the only point
that really should be up for discussion, because it is the only one in which
one can seriously engage in free inquiry and reach general conclusions
(regardless of whether such conclusions will be shared by a majority).
Unfortunately it is often confused with Points 2 and 3 by both believers and
nonbelievers.
Point 2 boils down to the
fact that attacks on religion are considered politically incorrect--witness the
remarks by Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura that resulted in an overnight drop
of 28 points in a poll of his popularity.
Scientists are especially
aware of the fact that their funding depends almost entirely on public
financing through various federal agencies such as the National Science
Foundation and the National Institutes of Health. Since federal funding is
controlled by politicians, who in turn have a very undemocratic tendency to
respond to every nuance of their constituency as gauged by the latest poll
(Jesse Ventura being the exception), it follows that no matter what your
opinion as a scientist on matters of the spirit, it is wiser to stick to your
job and avoid upsetting your prince and benefactor.
This is all the more so
because of two other things that we know about scientists: the overwhelming
majority of them do not believe in a personal God (about 60 percent of general
scientists and a staggering 93 percent of top scientists),3
and the reason they become scientists is to pursue questions for which science
is a particularly good tool. Most of these questions are rather more mundane
than the existence of God.
The result of this odd mix
is that most prominent scientists do not believe in a personal God because of
their understanding of science and of its implications, but come out in public
with conciliatory statements to the effect that there is no possible
contradiction between the two.4
The resolution to Point 2
is that there is a philosophical, if not scientific, contradiction between
science and religion (see below), but it is not in scientists' interest to
start an unholy war that they would lose (given the religious and political
climate of the
Point 3 is rarely raised
directly within the S&R debate, but it clearly lurks behind some of the
responses one gets when talking or writing about it. Let me make it as clear as
possible: no self-respecting scientist or educator--believer or
nonbeliever--would want to limit the freedom of speech or expression of any
party, including religionists or creationists. There is a fundamental, if
rarely fully appreciated, distinction between openly criticizing a position,
which is part of the very idea of free speech, and attempting to coerce people
into believing what you think is true, or limiting their ability to believe and
practice what you think is not true. While religious fundamentalists often do
not respect this distinction, most religious progressivists,
agnostics and atheists, do. It should therefore be clear that discussions about
science and religion, or evolution and creationism, deal with free inquiry and
education, and in no sense are meant to limit anybody's free speech. Asking to
limit what is taught in a science classroom to what is pertinent to that
science is sound educational policy, not censorship.
The Many Facets of
Science and Religion
In order to continue our
discussion of the legitimate philosophical, scientific, and religious aspects
of the science and religion quagmire we need a frame of reference to guide us.
What I present here is an elaboration on a classification scheme proposed by
Michael Shermer.5 Shermer suggests that there are
three worldviews, or "models," that people can adopt when thinking
about science and religion. According to the same worlds model there is only
one reality and science and religion are two different ways of looking at it.
Eventually both will converge on the same final answers, within the limited
capabilities of human beings to actually pursue such fundamental questions. The
conflicting worlds model asserts that there is only
one reality (as the same world scenario also acknowledges) but that science and
religion collide head on when it comes to the shape that reality takes. Either
one or the other is correct, but not both (or possibly neither, as Immanuel
Kant might have argued). In the separate worlds model science and religion are
not only different kinds of human activities, but they pursue entirely separate
goals. Asking about the similarities and differences between science and
religion is the philosophical equivalent of comparing apples and oranges.
"These are two such different things," Shermer
told Sharon Begley in Newsweek's cover story "Science Finds God,"
"it would be like using baseball stats to prove a point in
football."6
Using Shermer's
model as a starting point for thinking about S&R, I realized that something
is missing. One cannot reasonably talk about the conflict between science and
religion unless one also specifies what is meant by religion or God (usually
there is less controversy on what is meant by science, though some philosophers
and social scientists would surely disagree). So what makes Shermer's
picture incomplete is the very important fact that different people have
different Gods. I am not referring to the relatively minor variations of the
idea of God among the major monotheistic religions, but to the fact that God
can be one of many radically different things, and that unless we specify which
God we are talking about, we will not make any further progress.7
My tentative solution to
the problem is therefore presented in Figure 1. Here the panoply of positions
concerning the S&R debate is arranged along two axes: on the abscissa we
have the level of contrast between science and religion, which goes from none
(same worlds model) to moderate (separate worlds) to
high (conflicting worlds). On the ordinate is the "fuzziness" of the
concept of God, which ranges from a personal God who intervenes in everyday
human affairs to the concept of a Naturalistic God who acts only through the
laws of physics, to the most esoteric position of deism characterized by a God
who created the universe but did not interfere with it ever since.
Figure 1. A proposed
conceptual framework of the universe of positions concerning the relationship
between science and religion. The abscissa represents various degrees of
contrast between S&R, from the same worlds model
of Shermer (no conflict at all), to the more neutral
separate worlds to the definitively antagonistic conflicting worlds. The
ordinate summarize the variation present in the definitions of Gods used by
people involved in the debate, from the personal God of most mainstream
religions to a naturalistic God who acts only true physical laws He
established, to the rather remote Deist God who created the universe but did
nothing afterwards. The different philosophical positions within this scheme
are defined and discussed in the article; I apologize to individuals who might
feel their position on the diagram has been misplaced,
I assigned them on the basis of my interpretation of writings available to me.
Also, the list of main characters in the debate should obviously be much
longer, and not being included in the diagram does not mean that any particular
author did not contribute substantially to the debate. I will keep an updated
version of this scheme, including the best positions of individuals, on my web
site at http://fp.bio.utk.edu/skeptic.
These conceptions of God
may take many forms. However, the common denominator to the belief in a
personal God is the idea that (S)He intervenes in
individual lives, performs miracles, or otherwise shows direct concern for us
mortals. A naturalistic God, on the other hand, is a bit more detached: if (S)He intervenes at all it is through the tortuous ways of the
natural laws that (S)He himself designed for this universe. Finally, the God of
deism does not interfere, even indirectly, in human affairs, but simply answers
the fundamental question of why there is something instead of nothing.
Big Bangs, Anthropic Principles, and Christian Apologetics
Figure 1 shows
what personalities as diverse as physicists Paul Davies and Frank Tipler, conservative Christian apologist Alvin Plantinga, and science-religion crusader John Templeton
have in common, as well as where they differ. Sir John Templeton is a British
citizen native of
According to Sir John,
science has made incredible progress in discovering truths about the natural
world. Ergo, its powerful methods should be useful to religion in order to
augment our knowledge of God and matters spiritual. And Templeton is putting
his money where his mouth is by funding several scientific projects (at the
rate of hundreds of thousands of dollars each) as well as by awarding the Templeton
Prize, which is financially heftier than the Nobel.
Examples of the
science-to-religion connection that Templeton envisions are illuminating. His
Foundation has given hard cash to Pietro Pietrini of the National Institute of Neurological
Disorders and Stroke to study "Imaging brain activity in forgiving
people" ($125,000); Lee Dugatkin of the
Templeton's efforts (but
not necessarily those of all the researchers who are receiving his money) fall
into what can be termed scientific theism, that is, the idea that one can
scientifically investigate the mind of God. This particular position within the
science and religion universe is actually a very old and revered one, having
its roots in classical Christian Apologetics a la St. Thomas Aquinas and
continuing today through the efforts of individuals like Plantinga
and William Craig.
If, however, one believes
in a more remote kind of God but wishes to retain the concept of science and religion
uncovering the same truth, the choice is not limited to scientific theism. Two
other positions are possible, depending on whether one subscribes to a
naturalistic or to a deistic God, the Strong Anthropic
Principle and Weak Anthropic Principle, the latter
also known as the "God of the Big Bang." Of course, throughout this
discussion the actual position of individuals within my framework may be
different from what I suggest here, either because the boundaries between
categories are fuzzy rather than well delineated, or because I may have
misunderstood particular individuals' positions based on their writings.
The Weak Anthropic Principle says that there is very little
variation in the known constants and laws of physics that could be tolerated if
the universe were to be a place friendly to life as we know it.9 As is, this is
a rather trivial observation, but if one wants to read philosophical
implications into it, then it is a small leap of faith to claim that the
universe was created because life had to exist. From here, there is another
small logical gap to the Strong Anthropic Principle,
which infers an intelligent designer with a purpose behind the whole shebang.10
Several physicists and cosmologists have played with different versions of the Anthropic Principle, including Frank Tipler
(one of the original proponents of the principle) and Paul Davies, whose exact
position on the matter is a bit more difficult to ascertain, but whose awkward
combination of a connection with the Templeton Foundation and very careful
speculative writings on cosmology put him squarely in the upper left corner of
my diagram.11
The anthropic
principle is difficult to counter on purely philosophical grounds (see Ruse
this issue), other than it seems to be begging the question and somehow
reverses the direction of causality (a general cause is inferred from the
observation of a particular result of that cause). Furthermore, it is not
useful as a scientific hypothesis, since all it says is that we are here
because we are here. The Principle has, however, been effectively attacked on
positive scientific grounds by showing that many more possible universes could
support some sort of life, an attack that has weakened the
"improbable" argument on which the Principle is based.12 A more fatal
blow might come in the near future from superstring theory, the current working
hypothesis for the reconciliation of the theories of relativity and of quantum
mechanics.13
While all these positions
are compatible with Shermer's "same worlds"
scenario, it is clear that a scientist feels more and more comfortable the more
one moves toward the upper end of the ordinate in my diagram, that is, the more
fuzzy and distant the concept of God becomes (notice that one can adopt a
Strong Anthropic Principle scenario and slip toward a
personal God at the same time, as indicated by the arrow in the figure). This observation in and of itself, I think, points toward a
fundamental degree of discomfort between science and religion.
Gould, the Pope, and
When we examine the portion
of the graph in Figure 1 that falls in the area identified by Shermer as the domain of the "separate worlds"
model, we deal with a range of characters that go from agnostic evolutionary
biologist Stephen Jay Gould (Harvard) and nontheist
Eugenie Scott (National Center for Science Education) to the Pope himself,
passing through the ambiguous position of the charismatic Houston Smith, the
acclaimed author of The World's Religions).14 Let's see how this variation is
again accounted for by the different concepts of God these positions reflect.
Several scientists,
philosophers, and skeptics, including Shermer,15 Scott,16 Mayr,17 Pazameta,18
and Michael Ruse (see his essay this issue) loosely fall into the position
outlined by Gould as NOMA, or Non-Overlapping Magisteria19 (although Ruse is
mildly critical of some aspects of this position). NOMA says that science deals
with facts, religion with morality; the first focuses on what is, the latter on
what ought to be. Citing what in philosophy is known as the "naturalistic
fallacy"20--one cannot derive what ought to be from what is--Gould
concludes that science and religion are forever separate.
Another way to look at NOMA
has been articulated by Eugenie Scott when she made the distinction between
methodological and philosophical naturalism.21 According to Scott, science
adopts naturalism as a convenient tool for conducting research, in a
methodological sense. In order to deny the existence of God, however, one has
to be a naturalist in the philosophical sense of the term, that is, one has to
conclude that the physical world is all there is. Ergo, science cannot inform
us as to the existence of God, because naturalism is not a scientific
conclusion, but an assumption of the scientific method. If science does not
have anything to say about God (and obviously, says Scott, religion is
incapable of informing science about the natural world), then NOMA logically
follows.
Scott's reasoning is more
sophisticated than Gould's, though they share several points. The main
commonality is the fact that NOMA defenders are really using the concept of a
rather distant God detached from the everyday functioning of nature, since even
Gould (and certainly Scott, who makes a living out of valiantly battling
creationism) admits that a personal God is in direct contradiction with the
scientific evidence. A naturalistic God is marginally compatible with NOMA, but
both Gould and Scott seem to be rather uncomfortable with that notion.
I have criticized Gould's position
in detail elsewhere22 and I will therefore only summarize my objections to NOMA
here and then briefly turn to Scott's argument. As far as I can see there are
at least three points where NOMA fails: 1.) NOMA applies to the very special
concept of God that a deist would feel comfortable with, not to what most
people think of as "God." Hence, NOMA cannot heal the current schism
in our society between religionists and secularists, contrary to what Gould
claims. 2.) The naturalistic fallacy can be challenged. For one thing, why
shouldn't we use "what is" as at least a rough guide to what
"ought to be"? At the very least we should treat this as an open
question. Also, science can certainly inform us about the consequences of
"what is" so that we can better determine what ought to be to further
our own happiness, and science does a much better job at it than religion,
whose conclusions are derived from ancient authorities with little knowledge of
nature and of human psychology and sociology.23 3) It is certainly not true
that morality (or, more properly, ethics) is the sole domain of religion, since
ethical philosophy has also been providing us with a rational way of discussing
our behaviors and their social impact.
Scott's distinction between
methodological and philosophical naturalism is certainly more valid than
Gould's Solomonic separation between science and
religion. A full critique of her position is available online,24
but the gist of the counterargument has been clearly articulated by Will
Provine.25 Essentially, you can't have your cake and eat it too. Methodological
naturalism is not independent, but derived from philosophical naturalism.
Therefore, naturalism is an essential component of science not just as a
practical device, but because it is part of the very fabric of the scientific
method. For example, when scientists apply either Occam's
razor (a preference for explanations that make use of a minimum number of
necessary theoretical constructs) or Hume's dictum (a preference for less
"miraculous" explanations), they are practicing a particular
philosophy. Science cannot be divested of such philosophy without losing its
nature. This point is seized upon by creationists such as Phillip Johnson,26 who accuse science of being a religion. Provine's very reasonable rejoinder is that science does
indeed make a leap of faith, but that such leap is infinitesimal compared to
the leap made by religionists. Furthermore, science's leap--unlike religion's--has produced tangible miracles, such as the
laptop computer and a doubled lifespan.
Moving down the God axis in
Figure I we come to what I have termed "theistic science" (as opposed
to scientific theism). It is not exactly clear how well Smith fits into this
category, but his position is the closest I could find to represent the land
between NOMA and the Pope (notice the diagonal arrow bridging theistic science
and scientific theism, which could represent two sides of the same coin). Smith
argues against scientism, an idea that can be defined in different ways. I
would argue that scientism is the concept that science can and will resolve
every question or problem in any realm if given enough time and resources. I
don't think that even the most grant-hungry professional researchers readily
subscribe to it, but I know of individuals who seem to.27
Smith, however, thinks of
scientism (for example in a lecture delivered at
While the area occupied by
theistic science is borderline and intermixed with different degrees of
scientific theism and NOMA (and I do not know which specific mix Smith would
prefer), the general idea is that according to theistic science it is perfectly
sensible to say that there is a God as well as a physical universe. The
distinctive point of theistic science is that the God behind the universe works
in very subtle ways and entirely through natural laws, so that it is impossible
(or at least very difficult) to infer his presence (unlike the case of the Anthropic Principle, where an intelligent designer is the
only possible conclusion).
As the reader can see,
then, the center of the diagram in Figure 1 is a rather gray area from which
one can easily move to almost any other position by introducing one or more
qualifiers. If applied to evolution in particular, theistic science translates
into theistic evolution, where evolutionary theory is by and large correct
(therefore science is on solid ground), but it includes the added twist that
evolution is the (rather inefficient and clumsy) way God works. This is what
Barry Lynn (Americans United for the Separation of Church and State) may have
meant when he concluded the 1997 PBS Firing Line" debate for the evolution
side by suggesting that the Word (God) in the beginning may simply have been
"Evolve!"
The Pope's position assumes
the personal God of Catholics but it includes an element of fuzziness as well,
and it is accompanied by an arrow pointing left in Figure 1 because one could
think of it as a variation of the same worlds model
that does not go quite as far as scientific theism a la Templeton. Pope John
Paul II has expressed himself twice in the last few years on the relationship
between science and religion. In a letter written to the Pontifical Academy of
Sciences,29 he first declared that Christians should
not reject the findings of modern science, including evolutionary theory. This
is because, in his words, "Truth cannot contradict Truth" (which is
why this position could be construed as leaning toward the left side of the
diagram).
However, the Pope drew a
line at the origin of the human soul, which of course had to be injected
directly by God. This creates a rather abrupt discontinuity because it
introduces an arbitrary dualism within the process of human evolution, a
stratagem with which science does not sit very well, as Richard Dawkins pointed
out.30 John Paul II's more recently published
"Fides et Ratio"31 argues for the fact that science and faith can be
used to uncover parallel realities for which each is best equipped, similar to
what Gould states as the foundations of NOMA. It is because of this position
and the implied dualism that I situated the Pope toward the center of the
diagram.
Within the separate (or
almost separate) worlds, therefore, one can go from essentially no conflict
between science and religion if a deistic God is considered, to a position that
is logically possible but increasingly inconsistent with both Occam's razor and Hume's dictum. Depending on how much
importance one accords to the philosophical foundations of science, this area
of the Science-Religion space can be more or less comfortably inhabited by
moderate scientists or moderate religionists.
The Many Faces of
Creationism
The lower right corner of
Figure I is inhabited by two positions whose exponents have a lot in common but
who despise each other almost as much as they are opposed to everything else
that populates the R&S conceptual space. I am referring to
"classical" creationism as embodied, for example, by Duane Gish and his colleagues at the Institute for Creation
Research,32 and to the "neo-creationism" movement well represented by
Michael Behe33 (1996), William Dembski34 (1998), Phillip Johnson35 (1997) and
other associates of the "Discovery Institute."36
No matter what kind of
creationist you are, you are very likely to believe in a personal God and in a
fundamental conflict between science and religion (or at least, so it seems
from the array of publications within both the classical and neo-creationist
camps). The main difference between Gish's group and
Johnson's ensemble is that the latter is more sophisticated philosophically and
makes a more slick use of scientific terminology and pseudoscientific concepts.
They are also much more politically savvy, though they do not enjoy the
grassroots support of classical creationists because they ironically tend to be
seen by most people as "too intellectual."
Essentially, most neo-creationists
(among whom there is quite a bit of variation) do not believe in a young Earth,
accept micro-evolution (though recently so do some classical creationists),
don't believe in the literal truth of the Bible, and don't even call themselves
creationists--the preferred term for their version of things is
"intelligent design" (some even go so far as to avoid stating just
who this intelligent designer might be).
While debunking classical
creationism is nowadays not too trying of an intellectual exercise,37 neocreationists are quite
something else. Behe's book on "irreducible
complexity" makes the point that the molecular machinery of living
organisms is so complex and necessitates all of its parts working in synchrony
that it must have been designed. A good rebuttal has to span from David Hume's
devastating critique of the generalized version of the argument from design38
to modern findings on the evolution of specific biochemical pathways.39 Dembski's reasoning that intelligent design can be inferred
by excluding all other alternative hypotheses on probabilistic reasoning
entirely misses the more parsimonious explanation of unintelligent design
(i.e., natural selection) to account for biological history and diversity.40
Finally, Johnson's main thrust that science is really a philosophical
enterprise with no better claim to reality than religion can be dealt with by
using Provine's argument about philosophical
naturalism discussed above.
The Twin Souls of
Skepticism
Last, but not least, let's
consider the two main versions of modern skeptic ism, which have produced a
lively debate within the skeptic community and which represent the forefront of
rational thinking about science and religion.41 I am referring to what in
Figure 1 are labeled "scientific skepticism" and "scientific
rationalism," positions associated with people such as Carl Sagan, Will Provine, and Richard
Dawkins (the fact that my name falls in one of those fields merely reflects the
influence that these people have had on my thinking).42
First, notice that both
skeptical positions are rather unusual, in that they span more than one
quadrant, diagonally in the case of scientific skepticism, vertically for
scientific rationalism. Scientific skepticism is the position that skepticism
is possible only in regard to questions and claims that can be investigated
empirically (i.e., scientifically). For example, Novella and Bloomberg state
that "Claims that are not testable are simply outside the realm of
science."43 However, scientific skepticism immediately embarks on a
slippery slope that the same authors acknowledge in their article. They admit
that "Testable religious claims, such as those of creationists, faith
healers, and miracle men are amenable to scientific skepticism," so that
religion is not entirely out of the scope of skeptical inquiry.
Furthermore, they
acknowledge that there is no distinction in principle between religion and any
other kind of nonsense believed by all sorts of people: "There is no
distinction between believing in leprechauns, alien abductions, ESP,
reincarnation, or the existence of God--each equally lacks objective evidence.
From this perspective, separating out the latter two beliefs and labeling them
as religion--thereby exempting them from critical analysis--is intellectually
dishonest." That is, scientific skepticism converges toward scientific
rationalism (see below) when one considers personal gods that intervene in
everyday life, but moves toward a NOMA-like position if God is defined in a
distant and incomprehensible fashion.
One of the most convincing
arguments adduced by scientific skeptics to keep religion out of skeptical
inquiry is that a believer can always come up with unfalsifiable
ad hoc explanations of any inconsistency in a religious belief. While this is
certainly true, is this not an equally valid critique of, say, skeptical
inquiry into paranormal phenomena? After all, how many times have we heard the
"true believers" saying that the reason a medium failed a controlled
test is because of the negative vibrations produced by the skeptic? Nicholas
Humphrey, in his excellent Leaps of Faith,44 even
reports that paranormalists have come up with a
negative theory of ESP that "predicts" that the frequency of genuine
paranormal phenomena is inversely proportional to attempts at empirically
investigating them! This sounds like religious believers" attempts to save
their cherished mythology.
As much as one might
question scientific skepticism on the basis of more or less subtle
philosophical points, there is of course another, more practical side to this
position, which also makes for a convergence toward NOMA. As Novella and
Bloomberg honestly admit, it is a matter of resources: "This single issue,
which is not central to our purpose, could potentially drain our resources,
monopolize our public image, and alienate many potential skeptics."45 This
is, unfortunately, very true. It is also true that the skeptic community cannot
and should not require any article of faith (such as unbelief in God) from any
of its members. However, we do require that there are no sacred cows. Anything
and everything must be the subject of free inquiry and skeptical investigation.
To allow otherwise, for practical or any other kind of reasons, is an
intellectual travesty. On the other hand, what can and should be admitted is
that God and religion truly do represent only one facet of the universe of
interest to skeptics, and that skeptical analyses of
the God question may or may not be fruitful. Therefore, let us proceed with
caution, but proceed nevertheless.
Within the framework of
scientific rationalism one arrives at the belief in the nonexistence of God,
not because of certain knowledge, but because of a sliding scale of methods. At
one extreme, we can confidently rebut the personal Gods of creationists on firm
empirical grounds: science is sufficient to conclude beyond reasonable doubt
that there never was a worldwide flood and that the evolutionary sequence of
the Cosmos does not follow either of the two versions of Genesis.46 The more we
move toward a deistic and fuzzily defined God, however, the more scientific
rationalism reaches into its toolbox and shifts from empirical science to
logical philosophy informed by science. Ultimately, the most convincing
arguments against a deistic God are Hume's dictum and Occam's
razor. These are philosophical arguments, but they also constitute the bedrock
of all of science, and cannot therefore be dismissed as non-scientific. The
reason we put our trust in these two principles is because their application in
the empirical sciences has led to such spectacular successes throughout the
last three centuries.
Admittedly, the scientific
rationalist is on less firm ground the more she moves vertically up in Figure
1. But this is not a fatal blow because no reasonable skeptic asserts her
positions as definitive truths. All we are saying is "show us." The
main reason I prefer scientific rationalism to scientific skepticism (which is
more akin to the philosophical position known as empiricism and espoused by
many English philosophers between the 17th and 19th centuries) comes down to a
matter of which trade-offs one is more willing to accept. Scientific
skepticism trades off the breadth of its inquiry (which is limited) for the
power of its methods (which, being based on empirical science, are the most
powerful devised thus far). Scientific rationalism, on the other hand,
retains as much of the power of science as possible, but uses other
instruments--such as philosophy and logic--to expand the scope of its inquiry.
As a scientist I have been trained within scientific skepticism; as a somewhat
rational human being, I yearn for the wide horizons of scientific rationalism.
1. Kitty,
A. 1998. "Objectivity in Journalism: Should We be
Skeptical?" Skeptic 6(1), 54-61.
2. Letter to Skeptic, 6(4), 28.
3. Larson, E.J. and L. Witham. 1997. "Scientists
are Still Keeping the Faith." Nature 386:435-436;
Larson, E.J. and L. Witham. 1998.
"Leading Scientists Still Reject God." Nature 394:313.
4. Provine, W. 1988. "Scientists, Face It!
Science and Religion are Incompatible." The Scientist
9(5), 10.
5. Shermer, M. 1999. How We Believe: The Search for
God in an Age of Science.
6. Begley, S. 1998. "Science Finds God." Newsweek,
July 20, 46-52.
7. Pigliucci, M. 1998. "A Case Against God: Science and the Falsifiability
Question in Theology." Skeptic 6(2), 66-73.
8. Holden, C. 1999. "Subjecting Belief to the Scientific
Method." Science 284, 1257-1259.
9. Casti, J. L. 1989. Paradigms Lost.
10. Tipler, F. J. 1995. The Physics
of Immortality.
11. Davies, P. 1993. The Mind of God.
12. Stenger, V. J. 1996. "Cosmythology:
Was the Universe Designed to Produce Us?" Skeptic 4(2):36-41; Leikind, B.J. 1997. "Do Recent Discoveries in Science
Offer Evidence for the Existence of God?" Skeptic 5(2):66-69.
13. Greene, B. 1999. The Elegant Universe.
14. Smith, H. 1991. The World's Religions.
15. Shermer, M. 1998. "Is God Dead?"
Skeptic 6(3), 80-87.
16. Scott, E.C. 1999. "The 'Science and Religion
Movement'." Skeptical Inquirer 23(4), 29-31.
17. Mayr, E. 1999. "The
Concerns of Science." Skeptical Inquirer 23(4),
65.
18. Pazameta, Z. 1999. "Science
vs. Religion." Skeptical Inquirer 23(4), 37-39.
19. Gould, S. J. 1997. "Nonoverlapping Magisteria." Natural History, March,
16-22; Gould, S.J. 1999. Rocks of Ages.
20. Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethical.
21. Scott, 1999.
22. Pigliucci, M. 1999. "Gould's Separate 'Magisteria': Two Views." A review of
Rocks of Ages by S.J. Gould. Skeptical Inquirer 23(6), 53-56.
23. As I argued in Skeptic 6(2), this cannot be a blanket statement, but
requires a specification of which particular set of religious beliefs one is
talking about. Unless otherwise stated, however, I am referring here to the
kind of personal god of the Judeo-Christian-Muslim tradition.
24. http://fp.bio.utk.edu/skeptic/Essays/provine scott.htm
25. Provine, 1988.
26. Johnson, P. 1997. Defeating Darwinism by Opening Minds.
InterVarsity Press,
27.
28. Smith, H. 1993 The Common Vision of the World's Religions Forgotten Truth. Harper,
29. Palevitz, B.A. and R. Lewis. 1999. "Short
Shrift to Evolution?" The Scientist 2/1, 11.
30. John-Paul-II 1997. "Message to the
31. Dawkins, R. 1999. "You Can't Have it Both
Ways: Irreconcilable Differences?" Skeptical Inquirer 23(4), 62-64.
32. http://www.cin.org/jp2/fides.html
33. Gish, D.T. 1995. Evolution: The Fossils
Still Say No! North
34. Behe, M.J. 1996.
35. Dembski, W.A. 1998. The Design
Inference.
36. Johnson, P. 1997.
37. http://www.discovery.org
38. Trott, R. 1994. "Debating the ICR's Duane Gish." talk.origins (accessed: 1/16/98), web page,
www.talkorigins.org/faqs/debating/gish.html; McIver, T. 1996. "A Walk Through Earth History: All Eight Thousand Years." Skeptic 4(1), 32-41; Shermer, M. 1997.
Why People Believe Weird Things.
39. Hume, D. 1779. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
40. Shanks, N. and K. H. Joplin. 1999. "Redundant Complexity: A Critical
Analysis of Intelligent Design in Biochemistry." Philosophy of Science
66:268-282; see also Kenneth Miller at
http://biomed.brown.edu/faculty/M/Miller/Behe.html
41. Pigliucci, M. (in press). "Chance,
Necessity, and the New Holy War Against Science."
A review of W.A. Dembski's The
Design Inference. BioScience.
42. Dawkins, 1999; Kurtz, P. 1999. "Should Skeptical Inquiry be Applied to Religion?" Skeptical
Inquirer 23(4), 24-28; Novella, S. and Bloomberg, D. 1999. "Scientific Skepticism, CSICOP, and the Local Groups."
Skeptical Inquirer 23(4), 44-46; Pazameta,
Z. 1999. "Science vs. Religion." Skeptical Inquirer 23(4), 37-39; Scott, 1999.
43. Allen, S. 1999. "Two Mind-Sets." Skeptical Inquirer 23(4), 47-49; Palevitz,
B.A. 1999. "Science and the Versus of
Religion." Skeptical Inquirer 23(4), 32-36;
Pinker, S. 1999. "Whence Religious Belief?"
Skeptical Inquirer 23(4), 53-54; Raymo,
C. 1998. Skeptics and True Believers.
44. Novella and Bloomberg, 1999.
45. Humphrey, N. 1996. Leaps of Faith.
46. Novella and Bloomberg, 1999.
47. Ledo, M. 1997. Bible Bloopers: Evidence that
Demands a Verdict, Too! A Skeptic Answers Josh McDowell.