In addition, jurors already have a difficult time weighing the strength of a positive identification because of procedural safeguards. For example, if other eyewitness were unable to identify the defendant jurors will not be told about it (Wells & Lindsay, 1980). Given this possible initial setback, one implication is that jurors should have the benefit of hearing an psychological expert evaluate the eyewitness identification for weakness.
For a critical exegesis of the use of psychological testimony in the courtroom, I highly suggest this article: Eyewitness Memory Research: Probative versus Prejudicial Value (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1996).
References
Cutler, B.L., Penrod, S.D., & Dexter, H.R. (1990). Juror sensitivity to eyewitness identification evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 14, 185-192.
Hastie, R. (1980). From eyewitness testimony to unreasonable doubt. Unpublished manuscript. In L.S. Wrightman, M.T. Nietzel and W.H. Fortune, Psychology and the legal system. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Loftus, E.F. (1974). Reconstructing memory: The incredible witness. Psychology Today, 8, 116-119.
Wells, G.L., & Lindsay, R.C.L. (1980). On estimating the diagnosticity of eyewitness nonidentification. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 776-784.
Wells, G.L., Lindsay, R.C.L., &
Ferguson, T.J. (1979). Accuracy, confidence, and juror perceptions in eyewitness
identification. Journal of Applied Psychology, 64, 440-448.