Fall 2005
Psychology 209: Topics in Judgment and Decision Making
|
Prof. Craig McKenzie |
Office: 2564A Mandler Hall |
Hours: By appointment |
|
Phone: 534-8075 |
Email: cmckenzie@ucsd.edu |
Wednesdays, 1-4, Crick Conference Room,
3rd floor Mandler Hall
Course Overview: In the late '60s, the consensus regarding judgment
under uncertainty was that people, by and large, behave in accord with
normative (or rational) statistical models. In the early '70s, Tversky and
Kahneman revolutionized thinking about this area by arguing that people rely on
a few simple cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) that lead to systematic errors
(biases). This new view led research in the area to mesh better with cognitive
psychology by focusing on the cognitive processes underlying judgment. The
heuristics-and-biases paradigm has had a large impact on all social sciences
and even some applied areas (e.g., business, law, medicine). The first half of
the class will focus on recent developments in, and shortcomings of, this
paradigm. The second half will take a critical look at "confirmation
bias," one of the most widely cited errors people purportedly make.
Requirements: Thoughtful reading and discussion are required. Participants must do all the reading each week and come to class prepared to discuss it. Grades will be based on class participation. Short papers might also be required (in which case they will also influence grades).
Week 1 (September 28): Organizational
meeting
Week 2 (October 5): Introduction to heuristics and biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 3-20). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally in Science, 1974, 185, 1124-1131.) [pdf]
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315. [pdf]
Week 3 (October 12): Some recent developments
Gilovich, T., & Griffin, D. (2002). Heuristics and biases: Then and now. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 1-18). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [pdf]
Kahneman, D. & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 49-81). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [pdf]
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002). The affect heuristic. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (pp. 397-420). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [pdf]
Week 4 (October 19): A different view
Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond "heuristics and biases." European Review of Social Psychology, 2, 83-115. [pdf]
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review, 103, 582-591. [pdf]
Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky. Psychological Review, 103, 592-596. [pdf]
Week 5 (October 26): More criticism
Funder, D. C. (1987). Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of social judgment. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 75-90. [pdf]
McKenzie, C. R. M. (2005). Judgment and decision making. In K. Lamberts and R. L. Goldstone (Eds.), Handbook of cognition (pp. 321-338). London: Sage. [pdf]
Week 6 (November 2): Introduction to
"confirmation bias"
Wason, P. C. (1960). On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 129-140. [pdf]
Snyder, M. (1981). Seek and ye shall find: Testing hypotheses about other people. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Heiman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Social cognition: The Ontario symposium on personality and social psychology (pp. 277-303). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. [pdf]
Skov, R. B., & Sherman, S. J. (1986). Information-gathering processes: Diagnosticity, hypothesis-confirmatory strategies, and perceived hypothesis confirmation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 93-121. [pdf]
Week 7 (November 9): So, how should you test a hypothesis?
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987). Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing. Psychological Review, 94, 211-228. [pdf]
Poletiek, F. (2001). Hypothesis-testing behavior (Chapter 2). East Sussex: Psychology Press. [pdf]
Week 8 (November 16): How prevalent is
confirmation bias?
McKenzie, C. R. M. (2004). Hypothesis testing and evaluation. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 200-219). Oxford: Blackwell. [pdf]
Klayman, J. (1995). Varieties of confirmation bias. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 32, 385-418. [pdf]
Week 9 (November 23): Different results of same test can be
differentially informative
Slowiaczek, L. M., Klayman, J., Sherman, S. J., & Skov, R. B. (1992). Information selection and use in hypothesis testing: What is a good question and what is a good answer? Memory and Cognition, 20, 392-405. [pdf]
McKenzie, C. R. M. (in press). Increased sensitivity to differentially diagnostic answers using familiar materials: Implications for confirmation bias. Memory and Cognition. [pdf]
Week 10 (November 30): Revisiting the issues
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2, 175-220. [pdf]
Nelson, J. D. (2005). Finding useful questions: On Bayesian diagnosticity, probability, impact, and information gain. Psychological Review, 112, 979-999. [pdf]